I can't comment on the '060 (though I do like ColdFires), but remember that there were *three* people in the AIM alliance, not just Apple and Motorola. That big blue gorilla was compelling, and while it's easy in this age of Core to say that Apple should have gone x86 from the beginning, how quickly we forget Pentium's early growing pains and the mess that Netburst turned into. So I don't think Apple going x86 at that point was as obvious a move at the time as hindsight would tell us now.
But, hey, my loyalties lie with POWER, so what do I know.
You know that old saw about a camel being a horse designed by a committee, of course... ;^)
I suppose in the end it's a bit difficult to *exactly* pin down the blame for the failure of PowerPC, but in hindsight the whole thing really sort of comes off as a "Three Stooges" episode. (Use your imagination as to which company maps to each stooge.) These days it's popular to blame IBM for not "coming up with the goods" in regards to a G4 successor, but arguably the writing was on the wall from almost the beginning. Apple shot the AIM Alliance squarely in the foot and actively sabotaged the whole effort by failing to license the Mac OS (in total, or piecemeal as part of the Taligent) on reasonable terms. (The "Mac Clones" don't count. The original goal of AIM was an open platform that could run software from multiple OSes seamlessly on off-the-shelf machines from any AIM-licenced manufacturer. The Mac Clone program had very specific hardware requirements dictated solely by Apple, and further required the presence of an Apple ROM.) Without MacOS' software base and pretty consumer-friendly face there was no particularly good reason for the bulk of the buying public to switch to PowerPC, and without a critical mass of customers PowerPC completely faceplanted on its stated goal of providing more "bang-for-buck" than those nasty old-fashioned CISC-based PCs could provide. You can't blame IBM for losing interest in a niche business which didn't make them any money. And of course Motorola, with its laser focus on embedded platforms, didn't care one bit about PowerPC's performance stagnating as time went on... after all, they were still plenty fast for everything Motorola's customers wanted them for. I doubt Motorola's heart was *ever* really in it.
Total fail all around, really.
I'd still posit that Apple was suffering from some sort of Fatal Attraction to RISC, a kind of corporate inferiority complex. It's interesting how almost every major UNIX workstation vendor (SUN, SGI, HP/Apollo...) founded their business on the back of the Motorola 68k line, but by the late 80's had jumped ship to an in-house RISC design. (SUN to SPARC; SGI to MIPS; HP to PA-RISC...) Clearly Apple had this idea stuck in their heads that they were a "Workstation" vendor (despite all the evidence to the contrary) and felt they needed RISC as well. There's one thing that all these manufacturers did that Apple didn't have the option to do, however: the UNIX workstation vendors almost completely ignored backwards binary compatibility. SUN sold 68030, SPARC, and even *i386*-based machines all at the same time at one point, all running "SunOS 4", but there was no expectation that you could take a compiled program from one of those machines and run it on another one. Being able to do that on an Apple machine was *vital*, unless they were willing to call the new machines something other than "Macintoshes". (Which was actually the plan when they first looked at RISC, via the "Jaguar" project.)
Apple's devious plan for incorporating binary emulation seamlessly into the existing Mac OS was very clever, but it also meant they wasted loads of effort making a new CPU act like an older one, time that might of been better spent simply making the old CPU faster. (Hey, all those workstation vendors Apple was aping took CPU design in-house, why not Apple? They couldn't of done any worse than Motorola.) Furthermore, they also completely forgot about the original plan of creating a newer/better OS to take advantage of more modern and scalable software concepts. So in the end they ended up with the worst of both worlds: an archaic OS running via emulation on unproven and more expensive hardware. Way to go?
A point that Apple *really* missed in all this is that RISC as a design philosophy falls down when binary compatibility is a paramount design concern. RISC is heavily compiler-dependent, by its very definition needing code tuned and optimized to take advantage of the internal architecture of a CPU. Once you have to focus on running already-compiled-code *faster* then a "RISC" design starts converging on a comparable-performance CISC design in complexity because you start requiring the same sort of hardware tricks to optimize performance "on the fly". The details of instruction set almost become meaningless. With that being the case there's absolutely no reason why the 68k ISA couldn't of easily kept up with Intel's x86 designs, which in turn were usually at least in the same ballpark as the best RISC had to offer. The key, of course, is whether Apple could of sold enough Macintoshes to properly fund the research to produce such designs. Given Apple's focus on huge profit margins at the expense of market share? I dunno. You could argue it either way, but it's worth noting that even measly little design foundries like Cyrix were able to produce "competitive" x86-compatible products during the 90's on relatively shoestring budgets. If Apple had managed to expand their market base even a *little* they probably could of been producing AMD Athlon-speed 68k variants by the year 2000... notably the year that Apple failed to bring anything faster than 500Mhz to market, the same speed they ended up stuck at for 18 months while both Intel and AMD cracked the 1Ghz barrier.
Anyway. The PowerPC debacle is a great object lesson as to what happens when you let engineers make marketing decisions. :^b (It really pains me to say that, as I rarely have anything nice to say about the crazy stuff marketing asks engineering to deliver on ridiculous schedules. But, hey, they do know what Joe Sixpack actually wants. And in the end, "elegant" CPUs aren't it.)